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Abstract. We consider robust Markov Decision Processes with Borel state and action spaces,
unbounded cost and finite time horizon. Our formulation leads to a Stackelberg game against
nature. Under integrability, continuity and compactness assumptions we derive a robust cost
iteration for a fixed policy of the decision maker and a value iteration for the robust optimization
problem. Moreover, we show the existence of deterministic optimal policies for both players.
This is in contrast to classical zero-sum games. In case the state space is the real line we show
under some convexity assumptions that the interchange of supremum and infimum is possible
with the help of Sion’s minimax Theorem. Further, we consider the problem with special
ambiguity sets. In particular we are able to derive some cases where the robust optimization
problem coincides with the minimization of a coherent risk measure. In the final section we
discuss two applications: A robust LQ problem and a robust problem for managing regenerative
energy.
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1. Introduction
Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) are a well-established tool to model and solve sequential
decision making under stochastic perturbations. In the standard theory it is assumed that all
parameters and distributions are known or can be estimated with a certain precision. However,
using the so-derived ’optimal’ policies in a system where the true parameters or distributions
deviate, may lead to a significant degeneration of the performance. In order to cope with this
problem there are different approaches in the literature.
The first approach which is typically used when parameters are unknown is the so-called
Bayesian approach. In this setting a prior distribution for the model parameters is assumed and
additional information which is revealed while the process evolves, is used to update the beliefs.
Hence this approach allows that parameters can be learned. It is very popular in engineering
applications. Introductions can e.g. be found in [17] and [7]. In this paper we are not going to
pursue this stream of literature.
A second approach is the so-called robust approach. Here it is assumed that instead of having
one particular transition law, we are faced with a whole family of laws which are possible for
the transition. In the literature this is referred to as model ambiguity. One way of dealing
with this ambiguity is the worst case approach, where the controller selects a policy which is
optimal with respect to the most adverse transition law in each scenario. This setting can also
be interpreted as a dynamic game with nature as the controller’s opponent. The worst case
approach is empirically justified by the so-called Ellsberg Paradox. The experiment suggested
by [11] has shown that agents tend to be ambiguity averse. In the sequel, axiomatic approaches
to model risk and ambiguity attitude have appeared, see e.g. [13, 23]. [12] investigated the
question whether ambiguity aversion can be incorporated in an axiomatic model of intertemporal
utility. The representation of the preferences turned out to be some worst case expected utility,
i.e. the minimal expected utility over an appropriate set of probability measures. This set of
probability measures needs to satisfy some rectangularity condition for the utility to have a
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recursive structure and therefore being time consistent. The rectangularity property has been
taken up by [20] as a key assumption for being able to derive a Bellman equation for a robust
MDP with countable state and action spaces. Contemporaneously, [26] reached similar findings,
however limited to finite state and action spaces.
[34] have considered robust MDP beyond the rectangularity condition. Based on observed
histories, they derive a confidence region that contains the unknown parameters with a prespeci-
fied probability and determine a policy that attains the highest worst-case performance over this
confidence region. A similar approach has been taken in [35] where nested uncertainty sets for
transition laws are given which correspond to confidence sets. The optimization is then based on
the expected performance of policies under the (respective) most adversarial distribution. This
approach lies between the Bayesian and the robust approach since the decision maker uses prior
information without a Bayesian interpretation. All these analyses are restricted to finite state
and action spaces. A similar but different approach has been considered in [8] where parameter
ambiguity is combined with Bayesian learning methods. Here the authors deal with arbitrary
Borel state and action spaces.
In our paper we will generalize the results of [20] to a model with Borel spaces and unbounded
cost function. We consider finite horizon expected cost problems with a given transition law
under ambiguity concerning the distribution of the disturbance variables. The problem is to
minimize the worst expected cost. This leads to a Stackelberg game against nature. In order to
deal with the arising measurability issues which impose a major technical difficulty compared
to the countable space situation, we borrow from the dynamic game setup in [15] and [21].
The major difference of our contribution compared to these two works is the design of the
distributional ambiguity. We replace the topology of weak convergence on the ambiguity set by
the weak* topology σ(Lq, Lp) in order to obtain connections to recursive risk measures in Section
6. Moreover, we rigorously derive a Bellman equation. Note that [22] treats another robust
MDP setup with Borel state and action spaces, however deals with the average control problem.
Further, our model allows for rather general ambiguity sets for the disturbance distribution.
Under additional technical assumptions our model also comprises the setting of a decreasing
confidence regions for distributions. Moreover, we discuss in detail sufficient conditions for the
interchange of supremum and infimum. We provide a counterexample which shows that this
interchange is not always possible, in contrast to [26], [34]. This counterexample also highlights
the difference to classical two-person zero-sum games. Further, we are able to derive a connection
to the optimization of risk measures in MDP frameworks. In case the ambiguity sets are chosen
in a specific way the robust optimization problem coincides with the optimization of a risk
measure applied to the total cost.
The outline of the paper is as follows: In the next section we introduce our basic model
which is a game against nature concerning expected cost with a finite time horizon. Section
3 contains the first main results. Under integrability, continuity and compactness assumptions
we derive a robust cost iteration for a fixed policy of the decision maker and a value iteration
for the robust optimization problem. Moreover, we show the existence of optimal deterministic
policies for both players. This is in contrast to classical zero-sum games where we usually obtain
optimal randomized policies. In Section 4 we consider the real line as state space which allows
for slightly different model assumptions. Then in Section 5 we discuss (with the real line as state
space) when supremum and infimum can be interchanged in the solution of the problem. Under
some convexity assumptions this can be achieved with the help of Sion’s minimax Theorem
[33]. Being able to interchange supremum and infimum sometimes simplifies the solution of the
problem. In Section 6 we consider the problem with special ambiguity sets. In particular we are
able to derive some cases which can be solved straightforward and situations where the robust
optimization problem coincides with the minimization of a coherent risk measure. In the final
section we discuss two applications: A robust LQ problem and a robust problem for managing
regenerative energy.
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2. The Markov Decision Model
We consider the following standard Markov Decision Process with general Borel state and
action spaces and restrict ourselves to a model with finite planning horizon N ∈ N. Results
for an infinite planning horizon can be found in [14]. The state space E is a Borel space with
Borel σ-algebra B(E) and the action space A is a Borel space with Borel σ-Algebra B(A). The
possible state-action combinations at time n form a measurable subset Dn of E × A such that
Dn contains the graph of a measurable mapping E → A. The x-section of Dn,
Dn(x) = {a ∈ A : (x, a) ∈ Dn},
is the set of admissible actions in state x ∈ E at time n. The sets Dn(x) are non-empty by
assumption. We assume that the dynamics of the MDP are given by measurable transition
functions Tn : Dn × Z → E and depend on disturbances Z1, . . . , ZN which are independent
random elements on a common probability space (Ω,A,P) with values in a measurable space
(Z,Z). When the current state is xn the controller chooses action an ∈ Dn(xn) and zn+1 is the
realization of Zn+1, then the next state is given by
xn+1 = Tn(xn, an, zn+1).
The one-stage cost function cn : Dn × E → R gives the cost cn(x, a, x′) for choosing action
a if the system is in state x at time n and the next state is x′. The terminal cost function
cN : E → R gives the cost cN (x) if the system terminates in state x.
The model data is supposed to have the following continuity and compactness properties.
Assumption 2.1. (i) Dn(x) are compact and E 3 x 7→ Dn(x) is upper semicontinuous for
n = 0, . . . , N − 1, i.e. if xk → x and ak ∈ Dn(xk), k ∈ N, then (ak) has an accumulation
point in Dn(x).
(ii) Tn(x, a, z) is continuous in (x, a) for z ∈ Z and n = 0, . . . , N − 1.
(iii) cn, n = 0, . . . , N − 1, as well as the terminal cost function cN are lower semicontinuous.
For n ∈ N0 we denote by Hn the set of feasible histories of the decision process up to time n
hn =
{
x0, if n = 0,
(x0, a0, x1, . . . , xn), if n ≥ 1,
where ak ∈ Dk(xk) for k ∈ N0. In order for the controller’s decisions to be implementable, they
must be based on the information available at the time of decision making, i.e. be functions of
the history of the surplus process.
Definition 2.2. (i) A randomized policy is a sequence pi = (pi0, pi1, . . . , piN−1) of stochastic
kernels pin from Hn to the action space A satisfying the constraint
pin(Dn(xn)|hn) = 1, hn ∈ Hn.
(ii) A measurable mapping dn : Hn → A with dn(hn) ∈ Dn(xn) for every hn ∈ Hn is called
(deterministic) decision rule at time n. pi = (d0, d1, . . . , dN−1) is called (deterministic)
policy.
(iii) A decision rule at time n is called Markov if it depends on the current state only, i.e.
dn(hn) = dn(xn) for all hn ∈ Hn. If all decision rules are Markov, the deterministic
(N -stage) policy is called Markov.
For convenience, deterministic policies may simply be referred to as policy. With ΠR ⊇ Π ⊇
ΠM we denote the sets of all randomized policies, deterministic policies and Markov policies.
The first inclusion is by identifying deterministic decision rules dn with the corresponding Dirac
kernels
pin(·|hn) := δdn(hn)(·), hn ∈ Hn.
A feasible policy always exists since Dn contains the graph of a measurable mapping.
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Due to the independence of the disturbances we may without loss of generality assume that
the probability space has a product structure
(Ω,A,P) =
N⊗
n=1
(Ωn,An,Pn).
We take (Ω,A,P) as the canonical construction, i.e.
(Ωn,An,Pn) =
(Z,Z,PZn) and Zn(ω¯) = ωn, ω¯ = (ω1, . . . , ωN ) ∈ Ω
for all n = 1, . . . , N . We denote by (Xn), (An) the random state and action processes and define
Hn := (X0, A0, . . . , Xn). In the sequel, we will require Pn to be separable. Additionally, we
will assume for some results that (Ωn,An,Pn) is atomless in order to support a generalized
distributional transform.
Let n ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} be a stage of the decision process. Due to the product structure of
(Ω,A,P) the transition kernel is given by
Qn(B|x, a) =
∫
1B
(
Tn(x, a, zn+1)
)
Pn+1(d zn+1), B ∈ B(E), (x, a) ∈ Dn. (2.1)
We assume now that there is some uncertainty about Pn, e.g. because it cannot be estimated
properly. Moreover, the decision maker is very risk averse and tries to minimize the expected
cost on a worst case basis. Thus, we denote by M(Ωn,An,Pn) the set of probability measures
on (Ωn,An) which are absolutely continuous with respect to Pn and define for q ∈ (1,∞]
Mq(Ωn,An,Pn) =
{
Q ∈M(Ωn,An,Pn) : dQ
dPn
∈ Lq(Ωn,An,Pn)
}
.
Henceforth, we fix a non-empty subset Qn ⊆ Mq(Ωn,An,Pn) which is referred to as ambiguity
set at stage n. This can be seen as the set of probability measures which may reflect the law of
motion. Due to absolute continuity, we can identify Qn with the set of corresponding densities
w.r.t. Pn
Qdn =
{
dQ
dPn
∈ Lq(Ωn,An,Pn) : Q ∈ Qn
}
. (2.2)
Accordingly, we view Qn as a subset of Lq(Ωn,An,Pn) and endow it with the trace topolgy of
the weak* topolgy σ(Lq, Lp) on Lq(Ωn,An,Pn) where 1p + 1q = 1. The weak* topology in turn
induces a Borel σ-algebra on Qn making it a measurable space. We obtain the following result
(for a proof see the Appendix).
Lemma 2.3. Let the ambiguity set be norm-bounded and the probability measure Pn on (Ωn,An)
be separable. Then Qn endowed with the weak* topology σ(Lq, Lp) is a separable metrizable space.
If Qn is additionally weak* closed, it is even a compact Borel space.
In our cost model we allow for any norm-bounded ambiguity set Qn ⊆Mq(Ωn,An,Pn). For
applications, a meaningful way of choosing Qn (within a norm bound) is to take all probability
measures in Mq(Ωn,An,Pn) which are close to Pn in a certain metric like e.g. the Wasserstein
metric (see e.g. [36]). In our setting, that requires absolute continuity, the Kullback-Leibler
divergence could be a natural choice.
The controller only knows that the transition kernel (2.1) at each stage is defined by some
Q ∈ Qn+1 instead of Pn+1 but not which one exactly. We assume here that the controller faces
a dynamic game against nature. This means that nature reacts to the controller’s action an in
scenario hn ∈ Hn with a decision rule γn : Hn × A → Qn+1 where an ∈ Dn(xn). A policy of
nature is a sequence of such decision rules γ = (γ0, . . . , γN−1). Let Γ be the set of all policies of
nature. Since nature is an unobserved theoretical opponent of the controller, her actions are not
considered to be part of the history of the Markov Decision Process. A Markov decision rule
of nature at time n is a measurable mapping γn : Dn → Qn+1 and a Markov policy of nature
is a sequence γ = (γ0, . . . , γN−1) of such decision rules. The set of Markov policies of nature is
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denoted by ΓM . Thus we are faced with a Stackelberg game where the controller is the mover
and nature is the follower.
Lemma 2.4. For n = 0, . . . , N − 1 a decision rule γn : Hn × A → Qn+1 induces a stochastic
kernel from Hn ×A to Ωn+1 by
γn(B|hn, an) := γn(hn, an)(B), B ∈ An+1, (hn, an) ∈ Hn ×A.
For a proof of the lemma see the Appendix. In the sequel, it will be clear from the context
where we refer to γn as a decision rule or as a stochastic kernel.
The probability measure γn(·|hn, an), which is unknown for the controller, now takes the role
of Pn+1 in defining the transition kernel of the Markov Decision Process in (2.1). Let
Qγn(B|hn, an) =
∫
1B
(
T (xn, an, zn+1)
)
γn(d zn+1|hn, an), B ∈ B(E), hn ∈ Hn, an ∈ Dn(xn).
(2.3)
As in the case without ambiguity, the Theorem of Ionescu-Tulcea yields that each initial state
x ∈ E and pair of policies of the controller and nature (pi, γ) ∈ ΠR × Γ induce a unique law of
motion
Qpiγx := δx ⊗ pi0 ⊗Qγ0 ⊗ pi1 ⊗Qγ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ piN−1 ⊗QγN−1 (2.4)
on HN satisfying
Qpiγx (X0 ∈ B) = δx(B),
Qpiγx (An ∈ C|Hn = hn) = pin(C|hn),
Qpiγx (Xn+1 ∈ B|(Hn, An) = (hn, an)) = Qγn(B|hn, an)
for all B ∈ B(E) and C ∈ B(A). In the usual way, we denote with Epiγx the expectation operator
with respect to Qpiγx and with Epiγnhn or E
piγ
nx the respective conditional expectation given Hn = hn
or Xn = x.
The value of a policy pair (pi, γ) ∈ ΠR × Γ at time n = 0, . . . , N − 1 is defined as
VNpiγ(hN ) = cN (xN ), hN ∈ HN ,
Vnpiγ(hn) = Epiγnhn
[
N−1∑
k=n
ck(Xk, Ak, Xk+1) + cN (XN )
]
, hn ∈ Hn.
(2.5)
Since the controller is unaware which probability measure in the ambiguity set determines the
transition law in each scenario, he tries to minimize the expected cost under the assumption to
be confronted with the most adverse probability measure. The value functions are thus given
by
Vn(hn) = inf
pi∈ΠR
sup
γ∈Γ
Vnpiγ(hn), hn ∈ Hn,
and the optimization objective is
V0(x) = inf
pi∈ΠR
sup
γ∈Γ
V0piγ(x), x ∈ E. (2.6)
In game-theoretic terminology this is the upper value of a dynamic zero-sum game. If nature
were to act first, i.e. if infimum and supremum were interchanged, one would obtain the game’s
lower value. If the two values agree and the infima/suprema are attained, the game has a Nash
equilibrium, see also Section 5. But note here that players are asymmetric in information in our
setting.
Remark 2.5. [20] does not model nature to make active decisions, but instead defines the set
of all possible laws of motion. When each law of motion is of the form (2.4), he calls the set
rectangular. Our approach with active decisions of nature based on [15] and [21] is needed to
construct Markov kernels as in Lemma 2.4 with probability measures from a given ambiguity
set. When state and action spaces are countable as in [20] the technical problem of measurability
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does not arise and one can directly construct an ambiguous law of motion by simply multiplying
(conditional) probabilities. The rectangularity property is satisfied in our setting.
Our model feature that there is no ambiguity in the transition functions is justified in many
applications. Typically, transition functions describe a technical process or economic calculation
which is known ex-ante and does not have to be estimated. The same applies to the cost function.
3. Value Iteration and Optimal Policies
In order to have well-defined value functions we need some integrability conditions.
Assumption 3.1. (i) There exist α,
¯
, ¯ ≥ 0 with
¯
+ ¯ = 1, α 6= 1 and measurable functions
¯
b : E → (−∞,−
¯
] and b¯ : E → [¯,∞) such that it holds for all n = 0, . . . , N − 1,
Q ∈ Qn+1 and (x, a) ∈ Dn
EQ
[−c−n (x, a, Tn(x, a, Zn+1))] ≥ ¯b(x), EQ [¯b(Tn(x, a, Zn+1))] ≥ α¯b(x),
EQ
[
c+n (x, a, Tn(x, a, Zn+1))
] ≤ b¯(x), EQ [b¯(Tn(x, a, Zn+1))] ≤ αb¯(x).
Furthermore, it holds
¯
b(x) ≤ cN (x) ≤ b¯(x) for all x ∈ E.
(ii) We define b : E → [1,∞), b(x) := b¯(x) −
¯
b(x). For all n = 0, . . . , N − 1 and (x¯, a¯) ∈
Dn there exists an  > 0 and measurable functions Θ
x¯,a¯
n,1,Θ
x¯,a¯
n,2 : Z → R+ such that
Θx¯,a¯n,1(Zn+1),Θ
x¯,a¯
n,2(Zn+1) ∈ Lp(Ωn+1,An+1,Pn+1) and
|cn(x, a, Tn(x, a, z))| ≤ Θx¯,a¯n,1(z), b(Tn(x, a, z)) ≤ Θx¯,a¯n,2(z)
for all z ∈ Z and (x, a) ∈ B(x¯, a¯) ∩Dn. Here, B(x¯, a¯) is the closed ball around (x¯, a¯)
w.r.t. an arbitrary product metric on E ×A.
(iii) The ambiguity sets Qn are norm bounded, i.e. there exists K ∈ [1,∞) such that
E
∣∣∣∣ dQdPn
∣∣∣∣q ≤ K
for all n = 1, . . . , N and Q ∈ Qn.
Remark 3.2. (a)
¯
b, b¯ are called lower and upper bounding function, respectively, while b
is referred to as bounding function. As the absolute value is the sum of positive and
negative part, b satisfies for all n = 0, . . . , N − 1, Q ∈ Qn and (x, a) ∈ Dn:
EQ [|cn(x, a, Tn(x, a, Zn+1))|] ≤ b(x) and EQ [|b(Tn(x, a, Zn+1))|] ≤ αb(x)
(b) Assumptions 3.1 (i) and (ii) are satisfied with −
¯
b = b¯ = constant > 0 if the cost functions
are bounded.
(c) If p = 1 and hence q =∞, it is technically sufficient if part (ii) of Assumption 3.1 holds
under the reference probability measure Pn. Using Ho¨lder’s inequality and part (iii) we
get for every Q ∈ Qn+1
EQ
[−c−n (x, a, Tn(x, a, Zn+1))] ≥ E [−c−n (x, a, Tn(x, a, Zn+1))] ess sup dQdPn+1 ≥ K¯b(x),
EQ [
¯
b(Tn(x, a, Zn+1))] ≥ E [
¯
b(Tn(x, a, Zn+1))] ess sup
dQ
dPn+1
≥ αK
¯
b(x)
and analogous results for the upper bounding function. I.e. one simply has to replace α
by Kα. However, the factor Kα may be unnecessarily crude.
The next lemma shows that due to Assumption 3.1 (i) the value (2.5) of a policy pair (pi, γ) ∈
ΠR×Γ is well-defined at all stages n = 0, . . . , N . One can see that the existence of either a lower
or an upper bounding function is sufficient for the policy value to be well-defined. However, for
the existence of an optimal policy pair we will need the integral to exist with finite value and
therefore require both a lower and an upper bounding function.
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Lemma 3.3. Under Assumption 3.1 it holds for all policy pairs (pi, γ) ∈ ΠR × Γ, time points
n = 0, . . . , N and histories hn ∈ Hn
1− αN+1−n
1− α ¯b(xn) ≤ Vnpiγ(hn) ≤
1− αN+1−n
1− α b¯(xn).
Proof. We only prove the first inequality. The second inequality is analogous. We use that
Vnpiγ(hn) ≥
N−1∑
k=n
Epiγnhn
[−c−k (Xk, Ak, Xk+1)]+ EpiγNhN [−c−N (XN )]
and consider the summands individually. We have EpiγNhN
[−c−N (XN )] ≥ EpiγNhN [¯b(XN )] by As-
sumption 3.1 (i). Since γk is a mapping to Qk+1 it follows from the first inequality of Assumption
3.1 (i) that
Epiγnhn
[−c−k (Xk, Ak, Xk+1)] = ∫ Epiγkhk [−c−k (Xk, Ak, Xk+1)]Qpiγx (dhk|Hn = hn)
=
∫∫∫
−c−k
(
xk, ak, Tk(xk, ak, zk+1)
)
γk(d zk+1|hk, ak)pik(d ak|hk) Qpiγx (dhk|Hn = hn)
≥
∫
¯
b(xk) Qpiγx (dhk|Hn = hn) = Epiγnhn [¯b(Xk)]
for k = n, . . . , N − 1. Now, the second inequality of Assumption 3.1 (i) yields for k ≥ n+ 1
Epiγnhn [¯
b(Xk)] =
∫
Ek−1hk−1 [¯
b(Xk)]Qpiγx (dhk−1|Hn = hn)
=
∫∫∫
¯
b
(
Tk−1(xk−1, ak−1, zk)
)
γk−1(dzk|hk−1, ak−1)pik−1(dak−1|hk−1)Qpiγx (dhk−1|Hn=hn)
≥ α
∫
¯
b(xk−1)Qpiγx (dhk−1|Hn = hn) = αEpiγnhn [¯b(Xk−1)] .
Iterating this argument we obtain
Epiγnhn
[−c−N (XN )] ≥ αN−n¯b(xn) and Epiγnhn [−c−k (Xk, Ak, Xk+1)] ≥ αk−n¯b(xn).
Finally, summation over k yields the assertion. 
With the bounding function b we define the function space
Bb := {v : E → R | v measurable with λ ∈ R+ s.t. |v(x)| ≤ λ b(x) for all x ∈ E} .
Endowing Bb with the weighted supremum norm
‖v‖b := sup
x∈E
|v(x)|
b(x)
.
makes (Bb, ‖ · ‖b) a Banach space, cf. Proposition 7.2.1 in [19].
Having ensured that the value functions are well-defined, we can now proceed to derive the
cost iteration. To ease notation we introduce the following operators.
Definition 3.4. For functions v : Hn+1 → R s.t. v(hn, an, ·) ∈ Bb for all hn ∈ Hn, an ∈ Dn(xn)
and n = 0, . . . , N − 1 let
Tnpinγnv(hn) :=∫∫
cn
(
xn, an, Tn(xn, an, zn+1)
)
+ v
(
hn, an, Tn(xn, an, zn+1)
)
γn(d zn+1|hn, an)pin(d an|hn)
Tnpinv(hn) :=∫
sup
Q∈Qn+1
∫
cn
(
xn, an, Tn(xn, an, zn+1)
)
+ v
(
hn, an, Tn(xn, an, zn+1)
)
Q(d zn+1)pin(d an|hn)
Note that the operators are monotone in v.
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Proposition 3.5. Under Assumption 3.1 the value of a policy pair (pi, γ) ∈ ΠR × Γ can be
calculated recursively for n = 0, . . . , N and hn ∈ Hn as
VNpiγ(hN ) = cN (xN ),
Vnpiγ(hn) = TnpinγnVn+1piγ(hn).
Proof. The proof is by backward induction. At time N there is nothing to show. Now assume
the assertion holds for n+ 1, then the tower property of conditional expectation yields for n
Vnpiγ(hn) = Epiγnhn
[
cn(Xn, An, Xn+1) + Epiγn+1hnAnXn+1
[
N−1∑
k=n+1
ck(Xk, Ak, Xk+1) + cN (XN )
]]
=
∫∫
cn(xn, an, x
′) + Epiγn+1hnanx′
[
N−1∑
k=n+1
ck(Xk, Ak, Xk+1) + cN (XN )
]
Qγn(dx
′|hn, an)pin(d an|hn)
= TnpinγnVn+1piγ(hn)
for all hn ∈ Hn. 
Now, we evaluate a policy of the controller under the worst-case scenario regarding nature’s
reaction. We define the robust value of a policy pi ∈ ΠR at time n = 0, . . . , N − 1 as
Vnpi(hn) = sup
γ∈Γ
Vnpiγ(hn), hn ∈ Hn.
To minimize this quantity is the controller’s optimization objective. For the robust policy value,
a cost iteration holds, too. With regard to a policy of nature this is a Bellman equation given
a fixed policy of the controller.
Theorem 3.6. Let Assumptions 2.1, 3.1 be satisfied.
a) The robust value of a policy pi ∈ ΠR is a measurable function of hn ∈ Hn for n =
0, . . . , N − 1. It can be calculated recursively as
VNpi(hN ) = cN (xN ),
Vnpi(hn) = TnpinVn+1pi(hn)
b) If the ambiguity sets Qn+1 are weak* closed, there exist maximizing decision rules γ∗n of
nature for all n. Each sequence of such decision rules γ∗ = (γ∗1 , . . . , γ∗N−1) ∈ Γ is an
optimal response of nature to the controller’s policy, i.e. Vnpi = Vnpiγ∗, n = 0, . . . , N − 1.
Proof. The proof is by backward induction. At time N there is nothing to show. Now assume
the assertion holds at time n + 1, i.e. that Vn+1pi is measurable and that for every  > 0 there
exists an 2 -optimal strategy γˆ = (γˆn+1, . . . , γˆN−1) of nature. By Proposition 3.5 we have at n
Vnpi(hn) = sup
γ∈Γ
Vnpiγ(hn) = sup
γ∈Γ
TnpinγnVn+1piγ(hn) ≤ sup
γ∈Γ
TnpinγnVn+1pi(hn) ≤ TnpinVn+1pi(hn)
≤ TnpinγˆnVn+1pi(hn) +
ε
2
≤ TnpinγˆnVn+1piγˆ(hn)+ε = Vnpiγˆ(hn)+ ≤ Vnpi(hn) +  (3.1)
where γˆn : Hn ×A→ Qn+1 is a measurable 2 -maximizer.
Since  > 0 is arbitrary, equality holds. It remains to show the measurability of the outer
integrand after the second inequality and the existence of an 2 -maximizer. This follows from
the optimal measurable selection theorem in [29]: To see this, first note that the function
f(hn, an,Q) =
∫
cn
(
xn, an, Tn(xn, an, Zn+1)
)
+ Vn+1pi
(
hn, an, Tn(xn, an, Zn+1)
)
dQ,
is jointly measurable due to Lemma 4.51 in [1]. Consequently,
{(hn, an,Q) ∈ Hn ×A×Qn+1 : f(hn, an,Q) ≥ η} ∈ {S ×Q : S ∈ B(Hn ×A), Q ⊆ Qn+1} .
for every η ∈ R. The right hand side is a selection class. Obviously, it holds
Hn ×A×Qn+1 ∈ {S ×Q : S ∈ B(Hn ×A), Q ⊆ Qn+1} .
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Now, Theorem 3.2 in [29] yields that
Hn ×A 3 (hn, an) 7→ sup
Q∈Qn+1
f(hn, an,Q)
is measurable and for every  > 0 there exists an -maximizer γn : Hn ×A→ Qn+1.
For part b) we have to show that there exists not only a -maximizer γˆn at (3.1) but a
maximizer. This follows from Theorem 3.7 in [29]. The additional requirements are that Qn+1
is a separable metrizable space, which holds by Lemma 2.3, and that the set {Q ∈ Qn+1 :
f(hn, an,Q) ≥ η} is compact for every η ∈ R and (hn, an) ∈ Hn × A. By assumption, Qn+1 is
weakly closed and therefore compact by Lemma 2.3. Since due to Assumption 3.1 the integrand
of f is in Lp, the mapping Q 7→ f(hn, an,Q) is continuous for every (hn, an) ∈ Hn × A. Hence,
{Q ∈ Qn+1 : f(hn, an,Q) ≥ η} is closed as the preimage of a closed set. Since closed subsets of
compact sets are compact, the proof is complete. 
So far we have only considered the case that the ambiguity set may depend on the time index
but not on the state of the decision process. This covers many applications, e.g. the connection
to risk measures (see Section 6). Moreover, we can allow any norm bounded ambiguity sets as
long as it is independent of the state using the optimal selection theorem by [29] in Theorem
3.6. If the ambiguity set is weak* closed, the following generalization is possible.
Corollary 3.7. For n = 0, . . . , N − 1 let Qn be weak* closed and
Dn 3 (x, a) 7→ Qn+1(x, a) ⊆ Qn+1
be a non-empty and closed-valued mapping giving the possible probability measures at time n in
state x ∈ E if the controller chooses a ∈ Dn(x). Then the assertion of Theorem 3.6 b) still
holds.
Proof. We have to show the existence of a measurable maximizer at (3.1). The rest of the
proof is not affected. Since Qn+1 is weak* closed, it is a compact Borel space by Lemma 2.3.
Consequently, the set-valued mapping Qn+1(·) is compact-valued, as closed subsets of compact
sets are compact. In the proof of the theorem it has been shown that the function f(hn, an,Q)
is jointly measurable and continuous in Q. Hence, Proposition D.5 in [18] yields the existence
of a measurable maximizer. 
State dependent ambiguity sets are a possibility to make the distributionally robust optimality
criterion less conservative. E.g. they allow to incorporate learning about the unknown distur-
bance distribution. We refer the reader to [9] for an interesting example where the ambiguity
sets are recursive confidence regions for an unknown parameter of the disturbance distribution.
Let us now consider specifically deterministic Markov policies pi ∈ ΠM of the controller. The
subspace
B = {v ∈ Bb : v lower semicontinuous}.
of (Bb, ‖ ·‖b) turns out to be the set of possible value functions under such policies. (B, ‖ ·‖b) is a
complete metric space since the subset of lower semicontinuous functions is closed in (Bb, ‖ · ‖b).
We define the following operators on Bb and especially on B.
Definition 3.8. For v ∈ Bb and Markov decision rules d : E → A, γ : Dn → Qn+1 we define
Lnv(x, a,Q) =
∫
cn(x, a, Tn(x, a, Zn+1)) + v(Tn(x, a, Zn+1)) dQ, (x, a,Q) ∈ Dn ×Qn+1,
Tndγv(x) = Lnv
(
x, d(x), γ(x, d(x))
)
, x ∈ E,
Tndv(x) = sup
Q∈Qn+1
Lnv(x, d(x),Q), x ∈ E,
Tnv(x) = inf
a∈Dn(x)
sup
Q∈Qn+1
Lnv(x, a,Q), x ∈ E.
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Note that the operators are monotone in v. Under Markov policies pi = (d0, . . . , dN−1) ∈ ΠM
of the controller and γ = (γ0, . . . , γN−1) ∈ ΓM of nature, the value iteration can be expressed
with the help of these operators. In order to distinguish from the history-dependent case,
we denote the value function here with J . Setting JNpiγ(x) = cN (x), x ∈ E, we obtain for
n = 0, . . . , N − 1 and x ∈ E with Proposition 3.5
Jnpiγ(x) =
∫
cn
(
x, dn(x), Tn(x, dn(x), zn+1)
)
+ Jn+1piγ
(
Tn(x, dn(x), zn+1)
)
γn(d zn+1|x, dn(x)) = TndnγnJn+1piγ(x).
We define the robust value of Markov policy pi ∈ ΠM of the controller as
Jnpi(x) = sup
γ∈ΓM
Jnpiγ(x), x ∈ E.
When calculating the robust value of a Markov policy of the controller it is no restriction to
take the supremum only over Markov policies of nature.
Corollary 3.9. Let pi ∈ ΠM . It holds for n = 0, . . . , N that Jnpi(xn) = Vnpi(hn), hn ∈ Hn. I.e.,
we have the robust value iteration
Jnpi(x) = sup
Q∈Qn+1
∫
cn
(
x, dn(x), Tn(x, dn(x), Zn+1)
)
+ Jn+1pi
(
Tn(x, dn(x), Zn+1)
)
dQ
= TndnJn+1pi(x).
Moreover, there exists a Markovian -optimal policy of nature and if the ambiguity sets Qn+1
are all weak* closed even a Markovian optimal policy.
Proof. For n = N the assertion is trivial. Assuming it holds at time n+ 1, it follows at time n
from Theorem 3.6 that
Vnpi(hn) = sup
Q∈Qn+1
∫
cn
(
x, dn(x), Tn(x, dn(x), Zn+1)
)
+ Jn+1pi
(
Tn(x, dn(x), Zn+1)
)
dQ
= Jnpi(xn).
Replacing Hn × A by Dn, the existence of (-) optimal policies is guaranteed by the same
arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3.6. 
Let us further define for n = 0, . . . , N the Markovian value function
Jn(x) = inf
pi∈ΠM
sup
γ∈ΓM
Jnpiγ(x), x ∈ E.
The next result shows that Jn satisfies a Bellman equation and proves that an optimal policy of
the controller exists and is Markov.
Theorem 3.10. Let Assumptions 2.1, 3.1 be satisfied.
a) For n = 0, . . . , N − 1, it suffices to consider deterministic Markov policies both for the
controller and nature, i.e. Vn(hn) = Jn(xn) for all hn ∈ Hn. Moreover, Jn ∈ B and
satisfies the Bellman equation
JN (x) = cN (x),
Jn(x) = TnJn+1(x), x ∈ E.
For n = 0, . . . , N − 1 there exist Markov minimizers d∗n of Jn+1 and every sequence of
such minimizers constitutes an optimal policy pi∗ = (d∗0, . . . , d∗N−1) of the controller.
b) If the ambiguity sets Qn are weak* closed, there exist maximizing decision rules γ∗n of
nature, i.e. Jn = Td∗nγ∗nJn+1 and every sequence of maximizers induces an optimal policy
of nature γ∗ = (γ∗0 , . . . , γ∗N−1) ∈ ΓM satisfying Jn = Jnpi∗γ∗.
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Proof. We proceed by backward induction. At time N we have VN = JN = cN ∈ B due to
semicontinuity and Assumption 3.1 (i). Now assume the assertion holds at time n + 1. Using
the robust value iteration (Corollary 3.9) we obtain at time n:
Vn(hn) = inf
pi∈ΠR
sup
γ∈Γ
Vnpiγ(hn) = inf
pi∈ΠR
Vnpi(hn) = inf
pi∈ΠR
TnpinVn+1pi(hn)
≥ inf
pi∈ΠR
TnpinVn+1(hn) = inf
pi∈ΠR
∫
sup
Q∈Qn+1
LnJn+1(xn, an,Q)pin(d an|hn)
≥ inf
an∈Dn(xn)
sup
Q∈Qn+1
LnJn+1(xn, an,Q) = TnJn+1(xn).
Here, objective and constraint depend on the history of the process only through xn. Thus,
given the existence of a minimizing Markov decision rule d∗n the last expression is equal to
Tnd∗nJn+1(xn). Again by the induction hypothesis, there exists an optimal Markov policy pi =
(d∗n+1, . . . , d∗N−1) ∈ ΠM such that
Vn(hn) ≥ TnJn+1(xn) = Tnd∗nJn+1pi∗(xn) = Jnpi∗(xn) ≥ Jn(xn) ≥ Vn(hn). (3.2)
It remains to show the existence of a minimizing Markov decision rule d∗n and that Jn ∈ B. We
want to apply Proposition 2.4.3 in [7]. The set-valued mapping E 3 x 7→ Dn(x) is compact-
valued and upper semicontinuous. Next, we show that Dn 3 (x, a) 7→ supQ∈Qn+1 Lnv(x, a,Q) is
lower semicontinuous for every v ∈ B. Let {(xk, ak)}k∈N be a convergent sequence in Dn with
limit (x∗, a∗) ∈ Dn. The function
(x, a) 7→ cn
(
x, a, Tn(x, a, z)
)
+ v
(
Tn(x, a, z)
)
(3.3)
is lower semicontinuous for every z ∈ Z. The sequence of random variables {Ck}n∈N given by
Ck := cn
(
xk, ak, Tn(xk, ak, Zn+1)
)
+ v
(
Tn(xk, ak, Zn+1)
)
is bounded by some C¯ ∈ Lp(Ωn+1,An+1,Pn+1) by Lemma 8.1. Now, Fatou’s Lemma yields for
every Q ∈ Qn+1
lim inf
k→∞
Lnv(xk, ak,Q) = lim inf
k→∞
EQ
[
cn
(
xk, ak, Tn(xk, ak, Zn+1)
)
+ v
(
Tn(xk, ak, Zn+1)
)]
≥ EQ
[
lim inf
k→∞
cn
(
xk, ak, Tn(xk, ak, Zn+1)
)
+ v
(
Tn(xk, ak, Zn+1)
)]
≥ EQ [cn(x∗, a∗, Tn(x∗, a∗, Zn+1))+ v(Tn(x∗, a∗, Zn+1))] = Lnv(x∗, a∗,Q),
where the last inequality is by the lower semicontinuity of (3.3). Thus, the function Dn 3
(x, a) 7→ Lnv(x, a,Q) is lower semicontinuous for every Q ∈ Qn+1 and consequently Dn 3
(x, a) 7→ supQ∈Qn+1 Lnv(x, a,Q) is lower semicontinuous as a supremum of lower semicontinuous
functions. Now, Proposition 2.4.3 in [7] yields the existence of a minimizing Markov decision
rule d∗n at (3.2) and that Jn = TnJn+1 is lower semicontinuous. Furthermore, Jn is bounded by
λb for some λ ∈ R+ due to Lemma 3.3. Thus Jn ∈ B. Part b) follows from Theorem 3.6 b). 
4. Real Line as State Space
The model has been introduced in Section 2 with a general Borel space as state space. In
order to solve the distributionally robust cost minimization problem in Section 3 we needed a
continuous transition function despite having a semicontinuous model, cf. the proof of Theo-
rem 3.10. This assumption on the transition function can be relaxed to semicontinuity if the
state space is the real line and the transition and one-stage cost function have some form of
monotonicity. In some applications this relaxation of the continuity assumption is relevant.
Furthermore, a real state space can be exploited to address the distributionally robust cost min-
imization problem with more specific techniques. In addition to Assumption 3.1, we make the
following assumptions in this section.
Assumption 4.1. (i) The state space is the real line E = R.
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(ii) The model data satisfies the Continuity and Compactness Assumptions 2.1 with the
transition function Tn being lower semicontinuous instead of continuous.
(iii) The model data has the following monotonicity properties:
(iii a) The set-valued mapping R 3 x 7→ Dn(x) is decreasing.
(iii b) The function R 3 x 7→ Tn(x, a, z) is increasing for all a ∈ Dn(x), z ∈ Z.
(iii c) The function R2 3 (x, x′) 7→ cn(x, a, x′) is increasing for all a ∈ Dn(x).
(iii d) The function R 3 x 7→ cN (x) is increasing.
With the real line as state space a simple separation condition is sufficient for Assumption
3.1 (ii).
Corollary 4.2. Let there be upper semicontinuous functions ϑn,1, ϑn,2 : D → R+ and measurable
functions Θn,1,Θn,2 : Z → R+ which fulfil Θn,1(Zn+1),Θn,2(Zn+1) ∈ Lp(Ωn,An,Pn) and
|cn(x, a, Tn(x, a, z))| ≤ ϑn,1(x, a) + Θn,1(z), b(Tn(x, a, z)) ≤ ϑn,2(x, a) + Θn,2(z)
for every (x, a, z) ∈ D ×Z. Then Assumption 3.1 (ii) is satisfied.
Proof. Let (x¯, a¯) ∈ Dn. We can choose  > 0 arbitrarily. The set S = [x¯− , x¯+ ]×Dn(x¯− )
is compact w.r.t. the product topology. Moreover, B(x¯, a¯) ∩ Dn ⊆ S since the set-valued
mapping Dn(·) is decreasing. Due to upper semicontinuity there exist (xi, ai) ∈ S such that
ϑn,i(xi, ai) = sup(x,a)∈S ϑn,i(x, a), i = 1, 2. Hence, one can define
Θx¯,a¯n,i (·) := ϑn,i(xi, ai) + Θn,i(·), i = 1, 2
and Assumption 3.1 (ii) is satisfied. 
The question is, how replacing Assumption 2.1 (ii) by Assumption 4.1 affects the validity
of all previous results. The only result that was proven using the continuity of the transition
function Tn in (x, a) and not only its measurability is Theorem 3.10. All other statements are
unaffected.
Proposition 4.3. The assertions of Theorem 3.10 still hold when we replace Assumption 2.1
by Assumption 4.1. Moreover, Jn and J are increasing. The set of potential value functions can
therefore be replaced by
B = {v ∈ Bb : v lower semicontinuous and increasing}.
Proof. In the proof of Theorem 3.10 the continuity of Tn is used to show that Dn 3 (x, a) 7→
Lnv(x, a) is lower semicontinuous for every v ∈ B. Due to the monotonicity assumptions
Dn 3 (x, a) 7→ cn
(
x, a, Tn(x, a, zn+1)
)
+ v
(
Tn(x, a, zn+1)
)
is lower semicontinuous for every zn+1 ∈ Z. Now the lower semicontinuity of Dn 3 (x, a) 7→
Lnv(x, a) and the existence of a minimizing decision rule follows as in the proof of Theorem
3.10. The fact that Tnv is increasing for every v ∈ B follows as in Theorem 2.4.14 in [7]. 
In the following Section 5 we use a minimax approach as an alternative way to solve the
Bellman equation of the distributionally robust cost minimization problem and to study its
game theoretical properties. Subsequently in Section 6, we also consider special choices of the
ambiguity set which are advantageous for solving the optimization problem.
5. Minimax Approach and Game Theory
We assume E = R as in the last section. Compared to a risk-neutral Markov Decision Model,
the Bellman equation of the robust model (see Theorem 3.10) has the additional complication
that a supremum over possibly uncountably many expectations needs to be calculated. This can
be a quite challenging task. Therefore, it may be advantageous to interchange the infimum and
supremum. For instance, in applications it may be possible to infer structural properties of the
optimal actions independently from the probability measure Q after the interchange. Based on
the minimax theorem by [33], cf. Appendix Theorem 8.2, this section presents a criterion under
which the interchange of infimum and supremum is possible.
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Lemma 5.1. Let Assumptions 3.1, 4.1 be satisfied. Let A be a subset of a vector space, Dn be
a convex set, x 7→ cN (x), (x, a) 7→ Tn(x, a, z) be convex as well as (x, a, x′) 7→ cn(x, a, x′). Then
the value functions Jn and the limit value function J are convex.
Proof. The proof is by backward induction. JN = cN is convex by assumption. Now assume
that Jn+1 is convex. Recall that Jn+1 is increasing (Proposition 4.3). Hence, for every z ∈ Z
the function
Dn 3 (x, a) 7→ cn
(
x, a, Tn(x, a, z)
)
+ Jn+1
(
Tn(x, a, z)
)
is convex as a composition of an increasing convex with a convex function. By the linearity of
expectation,
Dn 3 (x, a) 7→ EQ
[
cn
(
x, a, Tn(x, a, Zn+1)
)
+ Jn+1
(
Tn(x, a, Zn+1)
)]
(5.1)
is convex for every Q ∈ Qn+1. As the pointwise supremum of a collection of convex functions
is convex, we obtain convexity of Dn 3 (x, a) 7→ supQ∈Qn+1 LJn+1(x, a,Q). Now, Proposition
2.4.18 in [7] yields the assertion. 
The assumptions of Lemma 5.1 are subsequently referred to as convex model.
Theorem 5.2. Let Assumptions 3.1, 4.1 be satisfied. In a convex model we have for all n =
0, . . . , N − 1
Jn(x) = inf
a∈Dn(x)
sup
Q∈Qn+1
LnJn+1(x, a,Q) = sup
Q∈Qn+1
inf
a∈Dn(x)
LnJn+1(x, a,Q), x ∈ R.
Proof. Let x ∈ R be fixed and define f : Dn(x)×Qn+1 → R,
f(a,Q) = Lnv(x, a,Q) = EQ
[
cn
(
x, a, Tn(x, a, Zn+1)
)
+ Jn+1
(
Tn(x, a, Zn+1)
)]
.
The function f is convex in a by (5.1) and linear in Q, i.e. especially concave. Furthermore,
the set Dn(x) is compact and it has been shown in the proof of Theorem 3.10 that f is lower
semicontinuous in a. Hence, the assertion follows from Theorem 8.2 a). 
Remark 5.3. The interchange of infimum and supremum in Theorem 5.2 is based on Sion’s
Minimax Theorem 8.2, which requires convexity of the function
a 7→
∫
cn
(
x, a, Tn(x, a, z)
)
+ Jn+1
(
T (x, a, z)
)
Q(d z) (5.2)
for every (x,Q) ∈ R × Q. This can be guaranteed by a convex model (cf. Lemma 5.1) which
means that several components of the decision model need to have some convexity property.
However, these assumptions are quite restrictive. Resorting to randomized actions is a standard
approach to convexify (or more precisely linearize) the function (5.2) without assumptions on
the model components. Let P(Dn(x)) be the set of all probability measures on Dn(x). Then it
follows from Sion’s Theorem 8.2 that
inf
µ∈P(Dn(x))
sup
Q∈Qn+1
∫
LnJn+1(x, a,Q)µ(da) = sup
Q∈Qn+1
inf
µ∈P(Dn(x))
∫
LnJn+1(x, a,Q)µ(da) (5.3)
= sup
Q∈Qn+1
inf
a∈Dn(x)
LnJn+1(x, a,Q).
The last equality holds since a 7→ cn
(
x, a, Tn(x, a, z)
)
+Jn+1
(
Tn(x, a, z)
)
is lower semicontinuous
(cf. the proof of Theorem 3.10) and Dn(x) is compact. This appears to be a very elegant solution
for the interchange problem, but unfortunately, the Bellman equation of the distributionally
robust cost minimization problem (2.6) under a randomized action of the controller is given by
Jn(x) = inf
µ∈P(Dn(x))
∫
sup
Q∈Qn+1
∫
cn
(
x, a, Tn(x, a, z)
)
+ Jn+1
(
Tn(x, a, z)
)
Q(d z)µ(d a) (5.4)
= inf
a∈Dn(x)
sup
Q∈Qn+1
LnJn+1(x, a,Q),
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cf. Theorems 3.6 and 3.10, and (5.3) does in general not equal (5.4). Recall that in our model
nature is allowed to react to any realization of the controller’s action. This was crucial to obtain
a robust value iteration in Theorem 3.6. In contrast to that, (5.3) means that nature maximizes
only knowing the distribution of the controller’s action. However, in general (5.3) 6= (5.4) as
will be shown in the next example.
Example 5.4. In order to see that (5.3) 6= (5.4) and that infimum and supremum cannot be
interchanged in general, consider the simple static counter example N = 1, E = R, A = [0, 1],
D = R×A, Z ∼ Bin(1, p), p ∈ [0, 1] = Q, T (x, a, z) = −(a−z)2 and c(x, a, x′) = x′. It is readily
checked that Assumption 4.1 is satisfied. Especially, one has constant bounding functions. In
this example (5.4) equals
inf
a∈[0,1]
sup
p∈[0,1]
Ep
[
c(x, a, T (x, a, Z))
]
= inf
a∈[0,1]
sup
p∈[0,1]
−(1− p)a2 − p(a− 1)2
= − sup
a∈[0,1]
inf
p∈[0,1]
(1− p)a2 + p(a− 1)2 = − sup
a∈[0,1]
min{a2, (1− a)2} = −1
4
.
If the controller chooses µ ∼ U(0, 1), then (5.3) must be less or equal than
sup
p∈[0,1]
∫ 1
0
−(1− p)a2 − p(a− 1)2 d a = sup
p∈[0,1]
−1
3
(1− p)− 1
3
p = −1
3
.
Indeed we obtain here supp∈[0,1] infa∈[0,1] Ep
[
c(x, a, T (x, a, Z))
]
= −12 . The approach to inter-
change infimum and supremum through a linearization with randomized actions works when
nature only observes the distribution and not the realization of the controller’s action. Also
note that the situation here is quite different to classical two-person zero-sum games. The fact
that infimum and supremum cannot be interchanged is a consequence of the asymmetric mover/-
follower situation. The example above with P pxa = (1 − p)a2 + p(a − 1)2 and [0, 1] discretized
can also be used as a counter-example within the setting of [26] and [34].
As mentioned before, the distributionally robust cost minimization model can be interpreted
as a dynamic game with nature as the controller’s opponent. Since nature chooses her action
after the controller, observing his action but not being restricted by it, there is a (weak) second-
mover advantage by construction of the game. The fact that infimum and supremum in the
Bellman equation can be interchanged means that the second-mover advantage vanishes in the
special case of a convex model.
Let additionally the one-stage ambiguity sets Qn be weak* closed. Now, the conditions of
Theorem 8.2 b) are fulfilled, too. Then, the ambiguity set is weak* compact by Lemma 2.3
and by Lemma 8.1 we have that cn
(
x, a, Tn(x, a, Zn+1)
)
+ Jn+1
(
Tn(x, a, Zn+1)
)
is in Lp. Thus,
Q 7→ LnJn+1(x, a,Q) is weak* continuous for every (x, a) ∈ D. This yields that (a,Q) 7→
LnJn+1(x, a,Q) satisfies the minimax-equality
min
a∈Dn(x)
max
Q∈Qn+1
LnJn+1(x, a,Q) = max
Q∈Qn+1
min
a∈Dn(x)
LnJn+1(x, a,Q)
and Lemma 2.105 in [3] implies that for every x ∈ R the function has a saddle point (a∗,Q∗),
i.e.
LnJn+1(x, a
∗,Q) ≤ LnJn+1(x, a∗,Q∗) ≤ LnJn+1(x, a,Q∗)
for all a ∈ D(x) and Q ∈ Qn+1. Such a saddle point constitutes a Nash equilibrium in the
subgame scenario Xn = x. We will show that Nash equilibria exist not only in one-stage
subgames but also globally.
Before, let us introduce a modification of the game against nature where nature instead of
the controller moves first. Given a policy of nature, the controller faces an arbitrary but fixed
probability measure in each scenario Xn = x. Thus, the inner optimization problem is a risk-
neutral MDP and it follows from standard theory that it suffices for the controller to consider
deterministic Markov policies. Clearly, the controller’s optimal policy will depend on the policy
that nature has chosen before. It will turn out to be a pointwise dependence on the actions of
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nature. To clarify this and for comparability with the original game (2.6), where the controller
moves first, we distinguish the following types of Markov strategies of the controller
Π(R) =ΠM = {pi = (d0, . . . , dN−1)| dn : R→ A measurable, dn(x) ∈ Dn(x), x ∈ R}
Π(R,Q) = {pi = (d0, . . . , dN−1)| dn : R×Qn+1 → A measurable, dn(x,Q) ∈ Dn(x), x ∈ R}
and of nature
Γ(R) = {γ = (γ0, . . . , γN−1)| γn : R→ Qn+1 measurable}
Γ(R, A) = ΓM = {γ = (γ0, . . . , γN−1)| γn : R×A→ Qn+1 measurable} .
The value Jnpiγ of a pair of Markov policies (γ, pi) ∈ Γ(R)× Π(R,Q) is defined as in (2.5). The
bounds in Lemma 3.3 apply since the proofs do not use properties of the policies. The game
under consideration is
J˜n(x) = sup
γ∈Γ(R)
inf
pi∈Π(R,Q)
Jnpiγ(x), x ∈ R, n = 0, . . . , N. (5.5)
For clarity, we mark all quantities of the game where nature moves first which differ from the
respective quantity of the original game with a tilde. The value of a policy of nature γ ∈ Γ(R)
is defined as
J˜nγ(x) = inf
pi∈Π(R,Q)
Jnpiγ(x), x ∈ R.
The Bellman operator on B can be introduced in the usual way:
T˜nv(x) = sup
Q∈Qn+1
inf
a∈Dn(x)
Lnv(x, a,Q), x ∈ R.
Theorem 5.5. Let Assumptions 3.1, 4.1 be satisfied, the ambiguity sets Qn+1 be weak* closed
and the model be convex.
a) J˜n ∈ B for n = 0, . . . , N and they satisfy the Bellman equation
J˜N (x) = cN (x),
J˜n(x) = T˜nJ˜n+1(x), x ∈ R.
There exist decision rules γ˜n : R → Qn+1 of nature and d˜n : R × Qn+1 → A of the
controller such that J˜n(x) = Td˜nγ˜n J˜n+1(x) and all sequences of such decision rules induce
an optimal policy pair γ˜ = (γ˜0, . . . , γ˜n−1) ∈ Γ(R) and p˜i = (d˜0, . . . , d˜n−1) ∈ Π(R,Q) i.e.
J˜n = Jnp˜iγ˜.
b) We have that Jn = J˜n = J˜nγ˜.
Proof. We have for n and x ∈ R:
Jn(x) = inf
pi∈Π(R)
sup
γ∈Γ(R,A)
Jnpiγ(x) ≥ inf
pi∈Π(R)
sup
γ∈Γ(R)
Jnpiγ(x) ≥ sup
γ∈Γ(R)
inf
pi∈Π(R)
Jnpiγ(x)
≥ sup
γ∈Γ(R)
inf
pi∈Π(R,Q)
Jnpiγ(x) = J˜n(x). (5.6)
Let pi∗ = (d∗0, . . . , d∗N−1) ∈ Π(R) and γ∗ = (γ∗0 , . . . , γ∗N−1) ∈ Γ(R, A) be optimal strategies for
the original game (2.6). The existence is guaranteed by Theorem 3.10. Then γ˜ = (γ˜0, . . . , γ˜N−1)
defined by γ˜n := γ
∗
n(·, d∗n(·)) lies in Γ(R) since the decision rules are well defined as compositions
of measurable maps.
We prove all statements simultaneously by induction. In particular we show that there exists a
policy p˜i ∈ Π(R,Q) such that
Jn = J˜nγ˜ = J˜np˜iγ˜ .
We show next that Jn ≤ J˜n. From Theorem 5.2 and the induction hypothesis we obtain
Jn(x) = LnJn+1(x, d
∗
n(x), γ˜n(x)) = inf
a∈Dn(x)
LnJn+1(x, a, γ˜n(x)) = inf
a∈Dn(x)
LnJ˜n+1(x, a, γ˜n(x)).
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Observe that again by the induction hypothesis
J˜nγ˜(x) = inf
pi∈Π(R,Q)
Jnpiγ˜(x) = inf
pi∈Π(R,Q)
LnJn+1piγ˜(x, dn(x, γ˜n(x)), γ˜n(x))
≥ inf
a∈Dn(x)
LnJ˜n+1γ˜(x, a, γ˜n(x)) = LnJ˜n+1γ˜(x, d˜n(x, γ˜n(x)), γ˜n(x))
= LnJ˜n+1p˜iγ˜(x, d˜n(x, γ˜n(x)), γ˜n(x)) = J˜np˜iγ˜ ≥ J˜nγ˜ . (5.7)
We will show below the existence of a minimizer d˜n in the second line is justified. Thus we get
equality in the expression above. Combining the previous two equations above we finally get
Jn(x) = inf
a∈Dn(x)
LnJ˜n+1(x, a, γ˜n(x)) = J˜nγ˜ ≤ J˜n(x).
In total we have shown that Jn = J˜n = J˜nγ˜ = J˜np˜iγ˜ . The joint Bellman equation for the
controller and nature J˜n = T˜ J˜n+1 follows from Theorem 5.2.
Finally, we verify the existence of a minimizer d˜n. Let {(xn, an,Qn)}n∈N be a convergent
sequence in R×A×Q with limit (x∗, a∗,Q∗). By dominated convergence (Lemma 8.1) and the
lower semicontinuity of Dn 3 (x, a) 7→ cn
(
x, a, Tn(x, a, zn+1)
)
+ v
(
Tn(x, a, zn+1)
)
for any v ∈ B
we obtain that the increasing sequence of random variables {Cm}m given by
Cm := inf
k≥m
cn
(
xk, ak, Tn(xk, ak, Zn+1)
)
+ v
(
Tn(xk, ak, Zn+1)
)
satisfies
Cm
Lp−→ C∗ ≥ cn
(
x∗, a∗, Tn(x∗, a∗, Zn+1)
)
+ v
(
T (x∗, a∗, Zn+1))
)
.
Since Qn+1 is norm bounded, Corollary 6.40 in [1] yields that the duality
(X,Q) 7→ EQ[X]
restricted to Lp(Ωn,An,Pn) × Qn+1 is jointly continuous, where Lp(Ωn,An,Pn) is considered
with the norm topology and Qn+1 with the weak* topology. Thus, we get
lim inf
m→∞ Lnv(xm, am,Qm) ≥ lim infm→∞ E
Qm
[
inf
k≥m
cn
(
xk, ak, Tn(xk, ak, Zn+1)
)
+ v
(
Tn(xk, ak, Zn+1)
)]
= lim
m→∞E
Qm [Cm] = EQ
∗
[C∗] ≥ EQ∗
[
cn
(
x∗, a∗, Tn(x∗, a∗, Zn+1)
)
+ v
(
Tn(x
∗, a∗, Zn+1))
)]
= Lnv(x
∗, a∗,Q∗),
which establishes the joint lower semicontinuity of Lnv(·). Note that J˜n+1γ˜ ∈ B and x 7→ Dn(x)
is compact-valued and upper semicontinuous. Hence, it follows from Theorem 2.4.3 in [7] that
there exists a minimizing decision rule d˜n : R×Qn+1 → A at (5.7) and that
R×Qn+1 3 (x,Q) 7→ inf
a∈D(x)
LnJ˜n+1γ˜(x, a,Q) = LnJ˜n+1γ˜(x, d˜n(x,Q),Q)
is lower semicontinuous. This completes the proof. 
Remark 5.6. Note that in contrast to classical zero-sum games we obtain the existence of
deterministic policies.
As a direct consequence we get the existence of Nash equilibria on policy level.
Corollary 5.7. Consider a convex model with weak* closed ambiguity sets Qn+1 and Assump-
tions 3.1, 4.1 fulfilled. For x ∈ R we get
Jn(x) = min
pi∈Π(R)
max
γ∈Γ(R,A)
Jnpiγ(x) = max
γ∈Γ(R)
min
pi∈Π(R,Q)
Jnpiγ(x) = J˜n(x).
Consequently, we even obtain
Jn(x) = min
pi∈Π(R)
max
γ∈Γ(R)
Jnpiγ(x) = max
γ∈Γ(R)
min
pi∈Π(R)
Jnpiγ(x).
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Proof. Theorem 5.5 implies equality in (5.6), i.e.
Jn(x) = min
pi∈Π(R)
max
γ∈Γ(R,A)
Jnpiγ(x) = inf
pi∈Π(R)
sup
γ∈Γ(R)
Jnpiγ(x)
= sup
γ∈Γ(R)
inf
pi∈Π(R)
Jnpiγ(x) = max
γ∈Γ(R)
min
pi∈Π(R,Q)
Jnpiγ(x) = J˜n(x). (5.8)
It remains to find optimal policies for the second and fourth equation of (5.8). Let
pi∗ = (d∗0, . . . , d
∗
N−1) ∈ Π(R), γ∗ = (γ∗0 , . . . , γ∗N−1) ∈ Γ(R, A)
and γ˜ = (γ˜0, . . . , γ˜N−1) ∈ Γ(R) p˜i = (d˜0, . . . , d˜N−1) ∈ Π(R,Q)
be optimal strategies for the first and fifth equation of (5.8), respectively, which exist by Propo-
sition 4.3 and Theorem 5.5. Then
inf
pi∈Π(R)
sup
γ∈Γ(R)
Jnpiγ = sup
γ∈Γ(R)
inf
pi∈Π(R)
Jnpiγ
is attained by the admissible strategy pair (pˆi, γˆ) ∈ Π(R)×Γ(R) which can be defined by dˆn := d∗n
and γˆn := γ
∗
n(·, d∗n(·)) or alternatively by dˆn := d˜n(·, γ˜n(·)) and γˆn := γ˜n for n = 0, . . . , N−1. 
6. Special Ambiguity Sets
In this section, we consider some special choices for the ambiguity set Qn+1 which simplify
solving the Markov Decision Problem (2.6) or allow for structural statements about the solution.
We assume a real-valued state space here.
Convex hull. It does not change the optimal value of the optimization problems if a given am-
biguity set Qn+1 is replaced by its convex hull conv(Qn+1) or its closed convex hull conv(Qn+1),
where the closure is with respect to the weak* topology. Clearly, to demonstrate this, it suffices
to compare the corresponding Bellman equations.
Lemma 6.1. Let Qn+1 be any norm bounded ambiguity set. Then it holds for all v ∈ B and
x ∈ R
inf
a∈Dn(x)
sup
Q∈Qn+1
Lnv(x, a,Q) = inf
a∈D(x)
sup
Q∈conv(Qn+1)
Lnv(x, a,Q) = inf
a∈D(x)
sup
Q∈conv(Qn+1)
Lnv(x, a,Q).
Proof. Fix (x, a) ∈ Dn. The function Q 7→ Lnv(x, a,Q) is linear. Thus, for a generic element
Q =
∑n
i=1 λiQi ∈ conv(Qn+1) we have
Lnv
(
x, a,
m∑
i=1
λiQi
)
=
m∑
i=1
λiLnv(x, a,Qi) ≤ max
i=1,...,m
Lnv(x, a,Qi),
i.e. there can be no improvement of the supremum on the convex hull. We also have that
conv(Qn+1) is metrizable and therefore coincides with the limit points of sequences in conv(Qn+1).
Since Q 7→ Lnv(x, a,Q) is weak* continuous (cf. proof of Theorem 3.6), the supremum cannot
be improved on the closure either. 
Integral stochastic orders on Qn+1. Following an idea of [25], one can define integral
stochastic orders on the ambiguity Qn+1 set by
Q1 ≤B,x,a Q2 :⇐⇒ Lnv(x, a,Q1) ≤ Lnv(x, a,Q2) for all v ∈ B
where (x, a) ∈ Dn is fixed and
Q1 ≤B Q2 :⇐⇒ Q1 ≤B,x,a Q2 for all (x, a) ∈ Dn.
If there exists a maximal element with respect to one of these stochastic orders, this probability
measure is an optimal action for nature (in the respective scenario). The proof of the next
lemma follows directly from the Bellman equation and the definition of the orderings.
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Lemma 6.2. (a) If there exists a maximal element Qn,x,a ∈ Qn+1 w.r.t. ≤B,x,a for every
(x, a) ∈ Dn, then γ = (γ0, . . . , γN−1) with γn(x, a) := Qn,x,a defines an optimal policy.
(b) If there exists a maximal element Q∗n ∈ Qn w.r.t. ≤B, then γ = (γ0, . . . , γN−1) with
γn ≡ Q∗n defines a constant optimal action of nature. That is, (2.6) can be reformulated
to risk-neutral MDPs under the probability measure Q∗n.
In fact, Lemma 6.2 holds for any state space. But it is only a reformulation of what is
an optimal action for nature. However, under Assumption 4.1 it has practical relevance when
a simpler sufficient condition for the integral stochastic order ≤B is fulfilled. We give three
exemplary criteria:
1. Let Z be a partially ordered space, e.g. Z = Rm, and assume that the transition functions
are increasing in z. Then the functions
Z 3 z 7→ cn(x, a, Tn(x, a, z)) + v(Tn(x, a, z)), v ∈ B, (x, a) ∈ Dn (6.1)
are increasing. Thus, Q1 ≤B Q2 is implied by the usual stochastic order of the disturbance
distributions QZn+11 ≤st QZn+12 and a maximal element of Qn+1 w.r.t. ≤st allows the same
conclusion as in Lemma 6.2 b).
2. Let Z be a real vector space, assume a convex model (cf. Lemma 5.1) and let the transition
functions Tn additionally be convex in z. Now, Lemma 5.1 yields that the functions (6.1)
are convex as compositions of increasing convex and convex mappings. Consequently,
≤B is implied by the convex order ≤cx of the disturbance distributions QZn+1 .
Convex order on the set of densities. Since the probability measures in Qn+1 are abso-
lutely continuous with respect to the reference probability measure Pn+1, we can alternatively
consider the set of densities Qdn+1 (see (2.2)). In general, one has to take care both of the
marginal distribution of the density and the dependence structure with the random cost when
searching for a maximizing density of the Bellman equation
inf
a∈Dn(x)
sup
Y ∈Qdn+1
E
[(
cn
(
x, a, Tn(x, a, Z)
)
+ Jn+1
(
Tn(x, a, Z)
))
Y
]
.
However, if Qdn+1 is sufficiently rich, the maximization reduces to comparing marginal distribu-
tions.
Definition 6.3. The set of densities Qdn is called law invariant, if for Y1 ∈ Qdn every Y2 ∈
Lq(Ωn,An,Pn) with Y2 ∼ Y1 is in Qdn, too.
Lemma 6.4. Let Assumptions 3.1, 4.1 be satisfied. If Qdn+1 is law invariant,
sup
Y ∈Qdn+1
E
[(
cn
(
x, a, Tn(x, a, Zn+1)
)
+ v
(
Tn(x, a, Zn+1)
))
Y
]
, (x, a) ∈ Dn, v ∈ B, (6.2)
is not changed by restricting the maximization to densities which are comonotonic to the random
variable Tn(x, a, Zn+1).
Proof. By Lemma 8.1 cn
(
x, a, Tn(x, a, Zn+1)
)
+ v
(
Tn(x, a, Zn+1)
)
are in Lp(Ωn+1,An+1,Pn+1)
for all (x, a) ∈ Dn. Thus the expectation (6.2) exists for all Y ∈ Lq(Z,Z,PZn+1). Note that
a product of r.v. with fixed margins is maximized in expectation when the r.v. are chosen
comonotonic. Due to the law invariance of Qdn+1 we can find for every Y ∈ Qdn+1 some Y ′ ∈
Qdn+1 comonotonic to cn
(
x, a, Tn(x, a, Zn+1)
)
+ v
(
Tn(x, a, Zn+1)
)
such that Y ′ ∼ Y and (6.2) is
maximal with Y ′. Since, the function R 3 x′ 7→ cn
(
x, a, x′
)
+v
(
x′
)
is increasing, this is the same
as requiring comonotonicity to Tn(x, a, Zn+1). 
For the comparison of marginal distributions one would naturally think of stochastic orders.
Here, the convex order yields a sufficient criterion for optimality. In order to obtain a connection
to risk measures, let us introduce the following notations:
Definition 6.5. Let FX be the distribution function of a real-valued random variable X.
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a) The (lower) quantile function of X is the left-continuous generalized inverse of FX
F−1X (α) := q
−
X(α) := inf{x ∈ R : FX(x) ≥ α}, α ∈ (0, 1).
b) The upper quantile function of X is the right-continuous generalized inverse of FX
q+X(α) := inf{x ∈ R : FX(x) > α}, α ∈ (0, 1).
Lemma 6.6 ([30, 2.1]). For any random variable X on an atomless probability space there exists
a random variable UX ∼ U(0, 1) such that
q−X(UX) = q
+
X(UX) = X P-a.s.
The random variable UX is referred to as (generalized) distributional transform of X. Note that
if h : R → R is increasing and left-continuous, then X and h(X) have the same distributional
transform.
Definition 6.7. Let φ : [0, 1] → R+ be increasing and right-continuous with
∫ 1
0 φ(u) du = 1.
Functionals ρφ : L
p → R¯
ρφ(X) :=
∫ 1
0
qX(u)φ(u) du.
are called spectral risk measures and φ is called spectrum.
When we choose the spectrum φ(u) = 11−α1[α,1](u) then we obtain the Expected Shortfall. Note
that every spectral risk measure is also coherent, i.e. monotone, translation-invariant, positive
homogeneous and subadditive.
In what follows we assume a non-atomic probability space.
Lemma 6.8. Let Assumptions 3.1, 4.1 be satisfied, Qdn+1 be law invariant and suppose there
exists a maximal element Y ∗n+1 of Qdn+1 w.r.t. the convex order ≤cx.
a) Then
ρφ(X) = sup
Y ∈Qdn+1
E[XY ], X ∈ Lp(Ωn+1,An+1,Pn+1),
defines a spectral risk measure with spectrum φn+1(u) := q
+
Y ∗n+1
(u), u ∈ [0, 1]. In this case,
γ = (γ0, . . . , γN−1) with γn(x, a) = φn+1(UTn(x,a,Zn+1)) is an optimal strategy of nature
in (2.6). Here UTn(x,a,Zn+1) denotes the distributional transform of Tn(x, a, Zn+1).
b) If additionally, the disturbance space is the real line Z = R and the transition function Tn
is increasing and lower semicontinuous in z, γ = (γ0, . . . , γN−1) with γn ≡ φn+1(UZn+1)
defines a constant optimal action of nature. That is, (2.6) can be reformulated to a
risk-neutral MDP with probability measures dQn+1 = φn+1(UZn+1) dPn+1.
Proof. (a) It holds Y ∗n+1 = q
+
Y ∗n+1
(UY ∗n+1) P-a.s. by Lemma 6.6. Therefore,
Qdn+1 ⊆ {Y ∈ Lq(Ωn+1,An+1,Pn+1) : Y ≤cx φn+1(U), U ∼ U(0, 1)} ,
and the random variables φn+1(U), U ∼ U(0, 1) are contained in both sets due to law
invariance. ρφ indeed defines a spectral risk measure (see Proposition 8.3) and φn+1(U˜) is
an optimal action of nature at time n given (x, a), where U˜ is the distributional transform
of the random variable
cn
(
x, a, Tn(x, a, Zn+1)
)
+ Jn+1
(
Tn(x, a, Zn+1)
)
.
Since the function R 3 x′ 7→ cn
(
x, a, x′
)
+ v
(
x′
)
is increasing and lower semicontinuous,
i.e. left continuous, it follows with Lemma 6.6 that U˜ = UTn(x,a,Zn+1).
(b) Under the additional assumptions we have that UTn(x,a,Zn+1) = UZn+1 . 
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Recall that the probability space under consideration is the product space. Under the as-
sumptions of Lemma 6.8 b) we can replace the probability measure P by
Q̂ :=
N−1⊗
n=1
Q∗n, dQ∗n = φn(UZn) dPn
and the optimization problem (2.6) can equivalently be written as
inf
pi∈ΠM
EQ̂x
[
N−1∑
n=0
cn(Xn, dn(Xn), Xn+1) + cN (XN )
]
. (6.3)
With the reversed argumentation of Lemma 6.8 a robust formulation of (6.3) is given by
inf
pi∈ΠM
sup
Q∈Q
EQx
[
N−1∑
n=0
cn(Xn, dn(Xn), Xn+1) + cN (XN )
]
(6.4)
with
Q =
{
N−1⊗
n=1
Qn : dQn = Yn dPn, Yn ∈ Lq(Ωn,An,Pn), Yn ≤cx φn(Un), Un ∼ U(0, 1)
}
.
The Yn, are indeed densities. Now, (6.4) can be interpreted as the minimization of a coherent
risk measure ρ
inf
pi∈ΠM
ρ
(N−1∑
n=0
cn(Xn, dn(Xn), Xn+1) + cN (XN )
)
(6.5)
and the problem can be solved with the value iteration
Jn(x) = inf
a∈Dn(x)
ρn
(
cn(x, a, Tn(x, a, Zn+1)) + Jn+1(Tn(x, a, Zn+1))
)
where ρn(X) = supY ∈Qdn+1 E[XY ] and J0(x) gives the minimal value (6.4).
Remark 6.9. Some authors already considered the problem of optimizing risk measures of
dynamic decision processes. For example [31] considered Markov risk measures for finite and
discounted infinite horizon models. In the final section he briefly discusses the relation to min-
max problems where player 2 chooses the measure. [32] treat similar problems (also with average
cost) with different properties of the risk maps. More specific applications (dividend problem
and economic growth) with the recursive entropic risk measures are treated in [4, 5]. In [10] the
authors treat the dynamic average-value at risk as a min-max problem. For this risk measure
there are also alternative ways for the solution, see e.g. [6],
7. Application
7.1. LQ Problem. We consider here so-called linear-quadratic (LQ) problems. The state and
action space are E = R andA = Rd. Let U1, . . . , Un, V1, . . . , VN be R- and Rd-valued random vec-
tors, respectively, and W1, . . . ,WN be random variables with values in R. The random elements
{Zn = (Un, Vn,Wn)}1≤n≤N are independent and the n-th element is defined on (Ωn,An,Pn). It
is supposed that the disturbances {Zn}1≤n≤N have finite 2p-th moments, p ≥ 1. The transition
function is given by
Tn(x, a, Zn+1) = Un+1x+ V
>
n+1a+Wn+1
for n = 0, . . . , N−1. Furthermore, let there be deterministic positive constants Q0, . . . , QN ∈ R+
and deterministic positive definite symmetric matrices R0, . . . , RN−1 ∈ Rd×d. The one-stage cost
functions are
cn(x, a, x
′) = cn(x, a) = x2Qn + a>Rna
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and the terminal cost function is cN (x) = x
2QN . Hence, the optimization problem under
consideration is
inf
pi∈ΠR
sup
γ∈Γ
Epiγ0x
[
N−1∑
k=0
X2kQk +A
>
k RkAk +X
2
NQN
]
. (7.1)
Policy values and value functions are defined in the usual way. For different formulations of
robust LQ problems, see e.g. [16].
Since Qn and the matrices Rn are positive semidefinite,
¯
b ≡ 0 is a lower bounding function
and the one-stage costs are at least quasi-integrable. In the sequel, we will determine the value
functions and optimal policy by elementary calculations and will show that the value functions
are convex and therefore continuous. Hence, we can dispense with an upper bounding function
and compactness of the action space.
Since the Borel σ-algebra of a finite dimensional Euclidean space is countably generated, it is
no restriction to assume that the probability measures Pn+1 are separable. Further, we assume
that for n = 0, . . . , N − 1
(i) the ambiguity sets Qn+1 ⊆Mq(Ωn+1,An+1,Pn+1) are norm bounded and weak* closed.
(ii) it holds EQ[Wn+1] = 0 for all Q ∈ Qn+1.
(iii) Wn+1 and (Un+1, Vn+1) are independent for all Q ∈ Qn+1, i.e. Q = QWn+1 ⊗QUn+1,Vn+1 .
I.e. Assumption 3.1 is satisfied apart from upper bounding. Theorems 3.6 and 3.10 use the
bounding, continuity and compactness assumptions only to prove the existence of optimal deci-
sion rules. Thus, we can employ the Bellman equation and restrict the consideration to Markov
policies as long as we are able to prove the existence of optimal decision rules on each stage.
We proceed backwards. At stage N , no action has to be chosen and the value function is
JN (x) = x
2QN . At stage N − 1, we have to solve the Bellman equation
JN−1(x) = inf
a∈A
sup
Q∈QN
cN−1(x, a) + EQ [JN (T (x, a, Zn+1))] (7.2)
= inf
a∈A
sup
Q∈QN
x2QN−1 + a>RN−1a+ EQ
[
(UNx+ V
>
N a+WN )
2QN
]
= inf
a∈A
sup
Q∈QN
x2QN−1 + a>RN−1a+ EQ
[
x2U2N + (V
>
N a)
2 +2xUNV
>
N a+W
2
N
]
QN
For the last equality we used that EQ [2WN (UNx+ VNa)] = 0 by assumption. Since RN−1 and
QN are positive (semi-) definite, the objective function (7.2) is strictly convex in a. Moreover,
it is linear and especially concave in Q. Finally, QN is weak* compact by the Theorem of
Banach-Alaoglu [1, 6.21] the objective function (7.2) is continuous in Q by definition of the
weak* topology since the integrand is in Lp(Ωn+1,An+1,Pn+1). Thus, the requirements of Sion’s
Minimax Theorem 8.2 b) are satisfied and we can interchange infimum and supremum in (7.2),
i.e.
JN−1(x) = sup
Q∈QN
inf
a∈A
x2QN−1 + a>RN−1a+ x2EQ[U2N ]QN + a>EQ[V >N VN ]aQN
+ 2xQNEQ[UNV >N ]a+ EQ[W 2N ]QN (7.3)
In order to solve the inner minimization problem it suffices due to strict convexity and smooth-
ness to determine the unique zero of the gradient of the objective function.
0 = 2RN−1a+ 2EQ[V >N VN ]aQN + 2xEQ[V >N UN ]QN
⇐⇒ a = −(RN−1 + EQ[V >N VN ]QN)−1EQ[V >N UN ]QNx.
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Note that the matrix
(
RN−1 + EQ[V >N VN ]
)
QN is positive definite and therefore invertible due
to the positive (semi-) definiteness of RN−1 and QN . Inserting in (7.3) gives
JN−1(x) = sup
Q∈QN
EQ[W 2N ]QN + x2
(
QN−1 + EQ[U2N ]QN
− EQ[UNVN ]
(
RN−1 + EQ[V >N VN ]QN
)−1
EQ[V >N UN ]Q2N
)
= sup
Q∈QN
EQ[W 2N ]QN + x2K
Q
N−1 = sup
QWN
EQ[W 2N ]QN + x2 sup
QUN,VN
KQN−1 (7.4)
where
KQN−1 = QN−1 + E
Q[U2N ]QN − EQ[U>NVN ]
(
RN−1 + EQ[V >N VN ]QN
)−1
EQ[V >N UN ]Q2N .
Since Jn(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ R we must have KQN−1 > 0 and since QN is weak* compact and
Q 7→ EQ[W 2N ]QN+x2KQN−1 weak* continuous, there exists an optimal measure γN−1(x) = Q∗N =
Q∗WN ⊗Q∗UN ,VN which is independent of x due to our independence assumption (iii). Since JN−1
is again quadratic we obtain when we define
KQn−1 = Qn−1 +K
Q
n
(
EQ[U2n]− EQ[U>n Vn]
(
Rn−1/KQn + EQ[V >n Vn]
)−1
EQ[V >n Un]
)
LQn−1 = −
(
Rn−1/KQn + EQ[V >n Vn]
)−1
EQ[V >n Un]
that γ∗n(x) ≡ γ∗n = argmaxQWn EQ[W 2n ] ⊗ argmaxQUn,Vn KQn and d∗n(x) = L
γ∗n
n x. Since the third
term of KQn−1 is a quadratic form nature should choose Q such that EQ[V >n Un] = 0 if possible and
maximize the second moment of Un. If this is possible, we obtain d
∗
n(x) = 0, i.e. the controller
will not control the system. In any case we see here the optimal choice of nature γ∗n(x) does not
depend on x.
When we specialize the situation to d = 1 we obtain
KQn−1 = Qn−1 +
(
EQ[U2n]−
(EQ[UnVn]2
Rn−1
KQn
+ EQ[V 2n ]
)
KQn .
Thus, nature has to maximize the expression in brackets. For a moment we skip the index n.
Let us further assume that (U, V ) is jointly normally distributed with expectations µU and µV
and variances σ2U and σ
2
V and covariance σU,V and that all these parameters may be elements of
compact intervals. Then the expression in brackets reduces to
σ2U + µ
2
U −
(σUV + µUµV )
2
R
KQ + σ
2
V + µ
2
V
.
We see immediately that both σ2V and σ
2
U have to be chosen as maximal possible value. The
remaining three parameters µU , µV and σUV have to minimize the fraction. If it is possible to
choose them such that µU is maximal and σUV + µUµV = 0 this would be optimal.
7.2. Managing regenerative energy. The second example is the management of a joint
wind and storage facility. Before each period the owner of the wind turbine has to announce
the amount a of energy she wants to produce. If there is enough wind in the next period she
receives the reward Pa where we assume that P > 0 is the fixed price for energy. Additional
energy which may have been produced will be stored in a battery with capacity K > 0. If there
is not enough wind in the next period, the storage device will be used to cover the shortage. In
case this is still not enough, the remaining shortage will be penalized by a proportional cost rate
c > 0 (see [2] for further background). We consider a robust version here, i.e. the distribution
Q of the produced wind energy varies in a set Q with bounded support [0, B]. The state is the
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amount of energy in the battery, hence E = [0,K]. Further A = [0, B] = D(x) and the action is
the amount of energy which is bid. We obtain the following Bellman equation:
Jn(x) = inf
a∈D(x)
sup
Q∈Q
{∫ B
a
−aP + Jn+1((x+ z − a) ∧K)Q(dz)
+
∫ a
0
−(a ∧ (z + x))P + (a− z − x)+c+ Jn+1((x+ z − a)+)Q(dz)
}
= inf
a∈D(x)
sup
Q∈Q
{
− aP +
∫ B
a
Jn+1((x+ z − a) ∧K)Q(dz)
+
∫ a
0
(P + c)(x+ z − a)− + Jn+1((x+ z − a)+)Q(dz)
}
From the last representation we see that
T (x, a, z) =
{
(x+ z − a) ∧K), z ≥ a
(x+ z − a)+, 0 ≤ z ≤ a
and
c(x, a, T (x, a, z)) = −aP +
{
0, z ≥ a
(P + c)(x+ z − a)−, 0 ≤ z ≤ a
We see that D(x) is compact and x 7→ D(x) is lower semicontinuous. T is continuous and c
is continuous and bounded. It is easy to see that Jn(x) is decreasing in x. Suppose Q has
a minimal element Q∗ w.r.t. ≤st. Then we can omit the supQ∈Q and replace Q by Q∗. The
remaining Bellman equation is then a standard MDP.
8. Appendix
8.1. Additional Proofs. Proof of Lemma 2.3:
Recall that we identify Qn with the set of the corresponding densities Qdn. The closure Qdn of
Qdn remains norm bounded. This can be seen as follows: Let X ∈ Qdn. Then there exists a net
{Xα}α∈I ⊆ Qdn such that Xα w
∗→ X. Hence,
E[XαY ]→ E[XY ] for all Y ∈ Lp(Ωn,An,Pn) with ‖Y ‖Lp = 1.
By Ho¨lder’s inequality we have for all α ∈ I
|E[XαY ]| ≤ E|XαY | ≤ ‖Xα‖Lq‖Y ‖Lp = ‖Xα‖Lq ≤ K.
Thus, |E[XY ]| ≤ K. Finally, due to duality it follows
‖X‖Lq = sup
‖Y ‖Lp=1
|E[XY ]| ≤ K.
The separability of the probability measure Pn makes Lp(Ωn,An,Pn) a separable Banach space.
Consequently, the weak* topology is metrizable on the norm bounded set Qdn [24, p. 157]. The
trace topology on the subset Qdn ⊆ Qdn coincides with the topology induced by the restriction of
the metric [27, 4.4.1], i.e. Qdn is metrizable, too.
Since Qdn is norm bounded and weak* closed, the Theorem of Banach-Alaoglu [1, 6.21] yields
that it is weak* compact. As a compact metrizable space Qdn is complete [1, 3.28] and also
separable [1, 3.26, 3.28]. Hence, Qdn is a Borel Space. The set of densities Qdn is also separable
as a subspace of a separable metrizable space [1, 3.5]. 
Proof of Lemma 2.4:
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Proof. By definition, γn(·|hn, an) is a probability measure for every (hn, an) ∈ Hn × A. Now
fix B ∈ An+1. The mapping δ : Qn+1 → [0, 1], δ(B) = EQ[1B] is weak*-continuous since
1B ∈ Lp(Ωn+1,An+1,Pn+1) and hence Borel measurable. Therefore,
Hn ×A 3 (hn, an) 7→ γn(B|hn, an) = δ ◦ γn(hn, an)
is measurable as a composition of measurable maps. 
8.2. Additional Statements.
Lemma 8.1. Let v ∈ Bb and n ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1}. Under Assumption 3.1 (ii) each sequence of
random variables
Ck = cn
(
xk, ak, Tn(xk, ak, Zn+1)
)
+ v
(
Tn(xk, ak, Zn+1)
)
induced by a convergent sequence {(xk, ak)}k∈N in Dn has an Lp-bound C¯, i.e. |Ck| ≤ C¯ ∈
Lp(Ωn+1,An+1,Pn+1) for all k ∈ N.
Proof. There exists a constant λ ∈ R+ such that |v| ≤ λb. Since Dn is closed, the limit point
(x0, a0) of {(xk, ak)}k∈N lies in Dn. Let  > 0 be the constant from Assumption 3.1 (ii) corre-
sponding to (x0, a0). Since the sequence is convergent, there exists m ∈ N such that (xk, ak) ∈
B(x0, a0) ∩ Dn for all k > m. For the finite number of points (x0, a0), (x1, a1), . . . , (xm, am)
there exist bounding functions Θxi,ain,1 ,Θ
xi,ai
n,2 by Assumption 3.1 (iii). Thus, the random variable
C¯ = max
i=0,...,m
(
Θxi,ain,1 (Z) + λΘ
xi,ai
n,2 (Z)
)
is an Lp-bound as desired. 
Theorem 8.2 ([33, 4.1, 4.2]). a) Let X be any set, Y compact and f : X×Y → R¯ concave-
convex-like and lower semicontinuous in the second argument, then
sup
x∈X
inf
y∈Y
f(x, y) = inf
y∈Y
sup
x∈X
f(x, y).
b) Let X be compact, Y any set and f : X × Y → R¯ concave-convex-like and upper semi-
continuous in the first argument, then
sup
x∈X
inf
y∈Y
f(x, y) = inf
y∈Y
sup
x∈X
f(x, y).
Spectral risk measures posses a specific dual representation becomes. The following statement
can be found in [28].
Proposition 8.3. A spectral risk measure ρφ : L
p → R with spectrum φ ∈ Lq can be represented
as
(i) ρφ(X) = supU∼U(0,1) E[Xφ(U)].
(ii) ρφ(X) = sup
{
E[XY ] : Y ∈ Lq, Y ≤cx φ(U), U ∼ U(0, 1)
}
.
The suprema are attained and the maximizer is given by φ(UX), where UX is the generalized
distributional transform of X.
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